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1. Introduction: Aims and Preliminary Considerations 
 
In this article we propose a cognitive-cultural model for the 
representation and derivation of linguistic expressions conveying the 
conceptual-semantic and conceptual-pragmatic ascription of cognitive, 
emotive, dispositional and behavioral attributes and traits, that is, 
attributes and traits related to the category Self in Spanish and English. 
Our main focus of interest will be the so-called folk model of 
phenomenological Self, as evinced in the everyday linguistic 
manifestations of Spanish and English speakers (with the proviso that the 
article lacks a contrastive angle proper). The model adopts a number of 
assumptions and constructs derived from cognitive anthropological and 
cognitive linguistic models (Johnson, 1987; D'Andrade, 1995). Thus the 
posited cognitive-cultural dimensions, attributes and features of Self have 
been derived from studies in phenomenological psychology, cognitive 
psychology, cultural anthropology and cognitive anthropolinguistics; to 
these constructs we have applied models of analysis adopted from 
cognitive-semantic and cognitive-cultural studies; and, finally, for the 
process of derivation of expressions we have adopted Levelt's Model of 
Speaking (1989), which distinguishes three stages: Conceptualization, 
Formulation and Articulation, and this model is complemented by some 
notional constructs from the Functional-Lexematic Model closely akin to 
Functional Grammar (Martín Mingorance, 1987; 1990a). In this 
introductory section we offer some general considerations about the 
semantic phenomenology and anthropology of self-categorization. In 
section 2 we describe some dimensions, domains, attributes and features 
involved in the representation of that category's cognitive-cultural 
schemas, and illustrate a model for the derivation and expression of such 
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schemas, distinguishing between an encoding-oriented, synthetic-
onomasiological approach, from a decoding-oriented, analytic-
semasiological approach. Finally, in section 3 we offer some concluding 
remarks.  
To summarize our aims, the programmatic questions to be 
addressed can be itemized as follows: 
 
What categorial dimensions and parameters (schemata, attributes, 
features) serve as molds and vehicles for the conceptualization of 
properties and types of selfhood?  
How are such categorizations encoded linguistically? What are 
some of the linguistic means to represent, refer to, and ascribe, traits, 
properties, and characteristics of conceptual categories of Self? 
What does the way a culture talks about its members' selves (as 
well as other cultures' selves) tell us about the way it thinks about 
selfhood? In other words, what are its cognitive-cultural models of this 
category? 
 
The self is a culturally-constituted category. It is generally viewed 
as a functional whole with a composite nature: mind, body, emotions, and 
personality. However, the unitary or compartmentalized functional 
composition of the self very much depends on the cultural psychology of a 
culture (Morris, 1994; Cohen, 1994), especially as regards the 
individualistic-collectivist distinction and its attendant analytic or holistic 
cognitive styles (Triandis, 1990). Again, the concept of self is contingent 
upon the ecological, cosmological, social and moral orders permeating the 
culture. The Tamils, for instance, are said to possess different kinds of 
bodies and personalities based on the qualities taken in from the soil at 
their birthplace (Lock, 1993). Likewise, in our culture, the existence of a 
concept such as smart is indicative of how cognition, in general, and a 
certain type of intelligence, in particular, is lexically conceptualized. The 
concept of smartness points to a certain manner of implementing a 
person's intellectual ability or knowledge. In reference to that particular 
concept, this means that defining what intelligence is in our culture 
reflects our understanding of how it is used and for what goals and tasks. 
In other words, the what is a function of the how (D'Andrade, 1989). In 
like manner, important social and individual consequences follow from a 
culture's concept of self as regards an individual and his/her social life: the 
gendered relations (the concepts of masculinity and femininity), 
socialization of children, the conception of the body, the relationship with 
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the natural world, the normative and moral order (do's and don't's, ought's 
and ought not's), etc. Phenomenologically speaking, the self is not a 
tangible entity, but rather an inferred abstraction from phenomenological 
experience. Nor is it a unitary concept, for it conjures up a composite, 
multi-faceted, many-layered phenomenon. Again, although universally-
categorized, different cultures conceive it in different ways (Geertz, 1983; 
Shweder and Bourne, 1984).  
Because of the intangible, composite, quasi-ineffable and 
relativistic nature of self, humans have developed culture-bound 
conceptual-linguistic categories representing its properties, attributes and 
traits in order to think and talk about it. Through talk people signal the 
pragmatic indexes of the culturally-constituted categories permeating a 
culture. Hence talking about the self (describing its attributes, ascribing 
properties and qualities to it, and evaluating it) is an index of both the 
subjective- and intersubjectively-constituted categories making up the 
mental and cultural models of a culture's members.  
At the outset, a distinction must be made between the purely 
personal style of talking about the self and the distinct communicative 
style and categories of a culture's conception(s) of the self. The former 
possesses subjective dimensions that elude the objective or intersubjective 
dimension of analysis: the personal voice narrating the self may be co-
terminous, but still distinct from the collective or communal voice (Miller 
et al, 1991). On the other hand, the way people talk about selfhood is a 
reflection of the way they think about it, which is another way of saying 
that it reflects the way people think about themselves and others. From 
this viewpoint, talking reflects thinking and thinking informs talking. 
However, thinking is not just the static product of cognition, but a process 
of cognitive functioning, for what we think about is intimately related to 
how we think. The above considerations seem to argue for an integrated 
treatment of language categories, cognition and action. It is for this reason 
that in this article we will approach the study of the linguistic 
categorization of self using concepts, ideas and methods from disciplines 
like cognitive linguistics and cognitive anthropology, which, for the last 
couple of decades have been attempting an integration of linguistic, 
conceptual and cultural knowledge, and which argue in favor of the 
interdependence of language, cognition, emotion and social action.  
Of special importance in this paper is the concept of cultural 
model as used and developed by cognitive anthropologists (Holland and 
Quinn, 1987), who stress the fact that understanding the meaning of a 
term entails understanding the implicit cultural models (of language and 
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thought) underlying it. A cultural model is a sort of intersubjectively-
shared schematic version of events in the world. Cultural models typically 
encode in a propositional as well as a motivational format all the 
information members of a culture possess that enables them to coordinate, 
interpret, and orient, their actions, beliefs, values, norms, etc (D'Andrade, 
1987). For cognitive anthropologists, many lexical-cultural terms like 
marriage, anger, lie, smart, etc. are 'constituted signs', and as such, 
encapsulate a great deal of cultural information and locally-grounded 
knowledge. From this theoretically-oriented, cognitive-cultural 
perspective, the student may then derive a series of possible implications 
and applications to be used in areas such as lexicology, cultural studies, 
cross-cultural semantics, sociocultural pedagogical guides, and cross-
cultural communication studies. 
In our search for a cognitive-cultural framework of analysis for 
the concept of self, we should bear in mind a number of points. Firstly, 
although universally found in all languages and cultures, it is nevertheless 
a culture-bound, many-faceted category. Different cultures hold different 
conceptions about its nature, structure and functions, and have proposed 
ways of conceptualizing it, often at odds with one another. This means 
that we are dealing with a relativist conception of a cognitive-cultural 
category. 
Secondly, as a non-natural kind category, its categorization is 
'constituted', in the sense of Searle, 1995. Unlike natural kind sign 
projections, constituted sign projections are the conventionalized creation 
of a culture. Constituted signs can be defined by means of the following 
formula: "X counts as Y under conditions C". Constituted signs are an 
attractive area for the linguist interested in the study of cultural models in 
language and thought. Words and expressions used by people to describe 
and ascribe personal cognitive, emotive and evaluative traits or properties 
to themselves or other selves may reflect/encode general tendencies of the 
human cognitive-perceptive-evaluative categorization system as well as 
particular, culture-bound ones (cfr. Wierzbicka, 1992). As a constituted 
sign, the categorization of selfhood may encode or reflect some general or 
even universal properties, but most saliently, it is likely to display the 
particular way in which a given people or culture conceives of it. There is 
no question that each culture possesses a distinctive concept of self, one 
that only partially overlaps with another culture's. The degree of overlap is 
likely to be the result of a host of historical, social, and psychological 
causes. By and large, cultures with a common axiological and historical 
tradition are likely to share most of their concept of self. Religion, history, 
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social evolution, and the like are factors underlying the weaving together 
of the different threads necessary for creating the tapestry of as complex a 
term as that of selfhood. The complexity of this term may be made 
manifest at different levels, for its categorization reflects and encodes 
various systems of parameters or dimensions.  
Thirdly, it is important to specify at which level of language 
experience our categorial analysis is to be framed. We may in principle 
distinguish between the following models of self:  
 
Reflexive models, which are for the most part encapsulated in the 
views passed down to us by the great religious and philosophical 
traditions since Antiquity;  
Expert models, which seek to provide us with a scientific or 
principled account of man's nature, as offered by the fields of psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, and philosophy;  
Folk models, which convey the phenomenologically-based, 
tradition-bound, commonsense view that we find encapsulated in the way 
members of a given culture talk about persons.  
Our concern here will be nearly exclusively with folk models.  
Fourthly, talk of self, whether from an expert model's or a folk 
model's perspective,often requires the operation of conceptual mapping 
and analogical reasoning. Common cognitive-linguistic devices for 
supporting the process of identifying, referring to or ascribing properties 
and attributes of self are: 
 
a) Image-schematic projections 
b) Ontologial and structural projections 
c) Cultural models 
 
These projections and models may be found in all types of 
linguistic manifestation, from words to discourse. Here, we will be 
concerned mostly with grammatical and lexical-grammatical expressions. 
As an example of these, consider the following Spanish expressions: 
 
(1) Es un cara. [lit. S/he is a face (= S/he has nerve.)] 
(2) Está fuera de sí. [S/he is out of him/herself (= S/he is very angry.)] 
(3) Está en una nube. [S/he is up on a cloud (= S/he is elated.)] 
(4) Está hundido. [S/he is sunk (= S/he is depressed.)] 
(5) Le salió del alma [It came out of his/her soul (= S/he spoke from the 
heart.)] 
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(6) Tiene buen corazón [S/he has good heart. (= S/he is good-hearted.)] 
(7) Tiene duende [S/he has elf. (= S/he has a certain magic.) 
(8) Dime con quién andas y te diré quién eres. [Tell me who you are going 
with, and I will tell you who  you are (= A man is known by the 
company he keeps.)] 
 
We can initially identify in these expressions a number of 
semantic-conceptual and semantic-structural constructs (inessive 
attributive predications, possessive predications, idiomatic proverbial 
expressions) involving metonymic and metaphoric conceptual projections 
(spatial and orientation metaphors of containment and verticality, as well 
as ontological and event metaphors) intended to convey ascriptions and 
evaluations of self: emotive states, states of mind, moral evaluations, 
behavioral dispositions, etc. These examples are meant to show some of 
the different ways of expressing the concept of self in Spanish in 
comparison to English, and hence of conceptualizing it cognitively-
culturally. Thus such linguistic conceptualizations point to various mental 
and cultural models of self in Spanish and English. Obviously, this 
linguistic folk view of the self does not exist in a conceptual vacuum since 
it constitutes the repository of the cultural experience of a people. As 
such, it is a construction of a people, i.e. a cultural-conceptual projection. 
The fact that this projection is also an accumulated, socio-historical 
phenomenon signifies that it is nourished by ancestral practices 
(mythologies, folklore), reflexive practices (religion, ethical and moral 
practices), ecological, historical and social factors, plus a host of other 
causes whose elucidation would call for an in-depth cultural-semiotic 
monographic treatment.  
 
2. Representation and Derivation of Dimensions, Parameters, 
Attributes and Features  
 
Our aim in this section is twofold:  
 
(i) to describe a model of representation of the dimensions, 
parameters, attributes and features of the cultural-cognitive categorization 
of self, as inductively inferred from its linguistic encodings (words, 
expressions, idioms, proverbs, and discourse); and as deductively imposed 
from cognitive-anthropological, and cognitive-semantic considerations. 
(ii) to exemplify a model of derivation of expressions conveying 
the posited cognitive-cultural dimensions or parameters of the model.  
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Thus, methodologically speaking, we combine an inductive and a 
deductive approach: elicitation and collection of samples of data with a 
view towards identifying a set of inferred cognitive-cultural dimensions 
and parameters underlying the data; and the application of deduced 
conceptual dimensions and parameters to samples of data.  
 
2.1. A Model of Representation 
 
W. Levelt (1989) has proposed a now classical Speaking Model 
roughly comprising the following components: (a) Conceptualizer; (b) 
Formulator; (c ) Articulator. We have adapted this model as a starting 
point for our own model of representation and derivation of self-
categorization. Leaving aside as irrelevant the articulatory component, in 
our adaptation the function served by the conceptualizer component is that 
of a repository of explicit/implicit verbal and episodic memory (word-
knowledge and world-knowledge). We leave aside the issue of the 
representational and procedural properties of this memory system, but we 
assume that it roughly consists of networks of schemas (both image and 
propositional schemata) making up subjective and intersubjective mental 
and cultural models with epistemic-representational and psycho-emotive 
(motivational) force. For the purpose of this article, we have recast 
Levelt's conceptualizer component into a series of cognitive-pragmatic 
and cognitive-cultural models, which are structured in a series of 
parameters and dimensions representing (culture-bound prototypical) 
attributes, features and properties of self. But in our model the 
conceptualizer component is made to serve a number of further functions:  
 
a) a cognitive-pragmatic-discursive function (ways of 
conceptualizing self for pragmatic purposes in the relevant interactive 
universe of discourse). That is, the speaker must possess representations in 
his/her cognitive environment of antecedent, and current information 
about the other selves involved in the communicative event in process, as 
well as about the contextual situation. At the same time, the speaker must 
try to convey a number of intentional meanings, for example: to refer to 
oneself rather than to another self; to identify the self; to assess its 
dispositions, traits (e.g. to praise or criticize), etc. 
b) a cognitive-cultural function (ways of conceptualizing self by 
means of mental and cultural models in language and thought). That is, 
the speaker must possess schematic representations of, for example, the 
self as a space, or as a substance, or as a machine, etc. Provision must be 
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made for some of the schematic representations to be idiosyncratic, totally 
or partially, ie., the result of personal meaning-construction strategies of 
representation. 
 
On the other hand, the formulator component can be said to have 
the following functions: 
 
a) a propositional-predicative function (in charge of assignment of 
basic or complex predication formats to the conceptualizing functions); 
b) an expressive function (in charge of assignment of pre-
phonological expression structures to the predicative functions). 
(These formulator component functions will be largely glossed 
over in our discussion). 
 
Below are itemized some examples of possible domains, 
dimensions, parameters, schemas and attributes, making up the cognitive-
pragmatic and cognitive-cultural functions: 
 
I. Discursive-pragmatic functions 
 
1. Pragmatic descriptive/ascriptive/atributive discourse strategies: 
referential, indexical, diagnostic, identificative, evaluative, vocative; 
1.1 Referential strategies: self-reference; other-reference; 
 
II. Conceptual domains of description/adscription: 
 
A) Dimensions of Self 
A.1. Cognition: epistemic/mental traits; states of mind; degree of 
consciousness/awareness, rationality, 
A.2. Affect: attitudinal/emotive/mood traits 
A.3. Dispositions: character, temperament, personality 
A.4. Behavioral traits: intelligence, imagination, performance skills 
A.5 Personal conduct: morality, manners 
A.6. Physical appearance: body, looks, stance 
 
B) Parameters 
B.1. Positive/neutral/negative 
B.2. Normality/abnormality 
B.3. Teleology, instrumentality, mediation 
B.4. Quantification, Individuation, Partition 
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B.5. Prototypicality/Stereotypicality 
 
C) Cognitive-Cultural Schemas description/ascription/attribution 
C.1. Embodied schemas 
C.1.1. containment/spatiality: 
C.1.2. orientation: up/down 
C.1.3 movement, force 
C.1.4 body (head, face, eyes, mouth..) 
C.1.4.1 body part as locus 
C.1.4.2 body part as mediated agency 
C.2. Ontological schemas 
C.2.1. Material Substances, 
C.2.2. Supernatural Substances: god(s), forces, spirits 
C.2.3. Metaphysical substances: mind, spirit, soul 
C.2.4. Nature: land, trees, animals 
C.2.5. Artifacts, machines 
C.3. Cognitive-Cultural schemas 
C.3.1. Reflexive models: mythology, religion, philosophy 
C.3.1.1. Expert models: psychology, sociology, anthropology 
C.3.2. Folk models: phenomenological self 
C.3.2.1. Ontological assumptions: object-typification and 
stereotypification 
C.3.2.2. Axiological assumptions: evaluation, orientation 
C.3.2.3. Logical-epistemical assumptions: beliefs and entailments 
C.3.2.1.1. Attributes and features of the phenomenological self 
(i) Continuity: The self is enduring. Individuality is not fleeting 
but a consistent, constant experience.  
(ii) Development: The self's individuality and continuity may 
change, for there are breaks in the continuity, as well as degrees of self-
consciousness about it. The self evolves both perceptibly and 
imperceptibly.  
(iii) Degree of self-consciousness: The sense of self is marked by 
the degree of self-awareness. This self-awareness may be experienced in 
terms of a scale: deep-shallow, expanded-shrinking, etc 
(iv) Unity and plurality: The self may be experienced as whole or 
fragmented, one or many. 
Individuality and connectedness: The self can be experienced as separate, 
bounded, unique, independent; or as connected, dependent, 
interdependent; or else as inner-directed or as outer-directed. 
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(v) Visibility and effability: The self is not a tangible object, but 
rather something hidden, occurring inside. It only shows itself by means 
of outward signals, which tell of the movements inside. At the same time, 
it is communicable by means of embodied mental and cultural 
schematizations involving projective mappings from source domains of 
concrete experience onto target domains of abstract concepts; 
(vi) Contents: The self is commonly thought of as a space or 
container. It contains inessive states, and generates internal events, such 
as: thoughts, beliefs, emotions, forces. There may be a functional locus for 
each of these, a center of functioning located in a part of the whole of self. 
Generally, the body acts as a container, and bodyparts may act as 
functional loci for different internal events: head, heart, liver, guts, blood, 
etc. Verbs of Possession together with a bodypart functional locus 
commonly express different behavioral, moral, emotional, cognitive traits: 
(e.g. Sp. 'Tiene la sangre caliente/ malas entrañas / mala leche / buen 
corazón / mala cabeza / cojones'). An alternative is inessive 
metonymization: e.g. 'Es un cara / cabezón / manitas'. 
(vii) Border/Limits: The self is commonly thought of as an inner 
space with outer limits, or a container that can be filled or emptied. Hence 
metaphoric spatial schematizations emotion and cognition attributes such 
as: 
- Spatiality and emotion (e.g. Sp. 'Le salió del alma'; 'Le entró pena'; 'Le 
vinieron ideas'; 'Se le han metido manías'; 'Me saca de quicio'); 
- Spatiality and mental ability (e.g. Sp. 'Hasta ahí no llego', Eng. 'That's 
beyond me; That's over my head'). 
(viii) Functional locus of centeredness: The self possesses 
different loci of function. Since the self is experienced both as unity and 
(functional) division, there must be a locus at which the main functions 
are located. There may also be an inner real self. Hence conceptual 
metonymies such as: 
- Rationality (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene una cabeza bien puesta' [= S/he is level-
headed]; 
- Morality and character (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene buen corazón' [= S/he is good-
hearted]. 
- Emotion and affectivity (e.g. Sp. 'Tiene roto el corazón' ) 
(ix) Depth and Strata: The self is a many-layered structure. It is 
also hierarchical. The self is not a shallow surface, but a space with depth 
(e.g. Sp. 'Tiene buen fondo' [= S/he is good-natured].  
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2.2. Synthetic-onomasiological and Analytic-semasiological 
Approaches 
 
We will now present a sample exemplification of the model of 
derivation sketched out above. As noted above, we distinguish (a) an 
encoding-oriented process, which works from Conceptualization to 
Formulation; (b) a decoding-oriented process, which works from 
Formulation to Conceptualization. In the synthetic-onomasiological 
process, we begin with a posssible conceptual pragmatic-discursive 
function, then we give the cognitive-cultural model(s) (together with the 
attendant ontological, epistemic, logical and axiological assumptions and 
entailments), and finally work out the predicative and expressive 
constructions realizing them. In the analytic-semasiological approach, we 
simply work out the cognitive-cultural models as well as the possible 
pragmatic-discursive functions underlying one or more related 
predications or expressions. 
 
2.2.1. Synthetic-Onomasiological Exemplification 
  
Let us imagine a dyadic conversation between two Spanish 
speakers whose main topic is an absent third person. Let us assume that at 
the conceptualizing level, one of the speakers chooses a pragmatic-
discursive function consisting in the summative negative evaluation of the 
absent person's character, perhaps a summative character evaluation 
offered as an uptake following a critical remark made by one of the 
interlocutors about the absent person's somewhat less-than-normal 
behavior. We can refer to it as an other-self derogatory evaluative 
ascription (OSDEA). Let us assume further that this negative evaluative 
ascription involves an evaluation of the person's mental-behavioral 
capacity or ability. Whittled down to its essentials, to encode this function, 
the speaker first retrieves a representatio of the OSDEA, then selects, as 
the second stage of the conceptualization, a cognitive-cultural model 
serving as conceptual vehicle to convey his/her pragmatic evaluation. Let 
us assume this cognitive-cultural model selected is the following: the Self-
as-Machine. Itemizing the above functions, we obtain the following 
propositional-representational model: 
 
1. Cognitive-Pragmatic function: other-self derogatory evaluative 
ascription 
2. Cognitive-Cultural model (individualist, technocratic culture): 
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 The Self is a Machine 
A. Ontological and epistemic assumptions (belief-categories) 
A.1. Outward behavior is an effect of inner causes and processes 
A.2. Inner processes are mechanisms 
A.3. The self has functional parts 
A.4. The self's functional parts are driven by these mechanisms 
A.5. The self's mind is machine-like  
A.6. The locus of intelligent functions is the mind 
B. Epistemic and Axiological Entailments 
B.1. Efficient mechanisms are driven by well-functioning parts 
B.2. Machines are inefficient when parts do not function well or are 
missing 
B.3. A well-functioning mind is an asset 
B.4. An ill-functioning mind is problematic and unreliable 
 
Next, at the formulation level, the speaker must choose a 
proposition-predicative format for encoding the selected cultural model 
for the pragmatic function of derogatory ascription. This format underlies 
a number of possible expressions. Obviously ther speaker has at his/her 
disposal a number of formulation options (both systemic and 
idiosyncratic) to encode the above pragmatic and cognitive-cultural 
models and schemas. Possible encodings might be: "Su mente no funciona 
bien", " Su cabeza no funciona bien". In both cases the expression encodes 
several metaphoric and metonymic projections derived from the general 
cognitive-cultural model employed (THE SELF IS A MACHINE; THE 
MIND IS THE GOVERNOR OF THE SELF; THE MIND WORKS LIKE 
A MACHINE WITH PARTS; THE HEAD IS THE SEAT OF THE 
MIND) by activating the lexical predicate NEG-FUNCIONAR (BIEN). 
Associated lexical models can be mobilized here as well as alternative 
encoding options. For example, the lexical predicate CARBURAR may be 
activated thus encoding another, more specific projection: "No le carbura 
la cabeza" (THE MOTOR ENGINE MODEL OF THE MIND). An 
alternative lexico-grammatical (idiomatic) expression might be: "Le falta 
un tornillo" [ = S/he is missing a screw = S/he has a screw loose]. Here 
the speaker chooses a high-level negative-possessive propositional 
predication (NO TENER ALGUIEN ALGO), encoded in the lexical-
predicate predicate FALTAR; we can abstractly capture this by means of 
the following Functional-Lexematic representation (Martín Mingorance, 
1990b:100ff): 
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NEG-POSSESSIVE PREDICATION::FALTAR [(X1:<concreto> 
(x1)EntityPos (x2: <concreto>: Object)EntityAff]State 
 
This idiomatic expression encapsulates a metaphoric displacement 
made posssible by the cognitive-cultural schematization THE MIND IS A 
MACHINE (and its attendant corallary assumptions and entailments 
detailed above: A MACHINE HAS PARTS; SOME PARTS ARE 
SCREWS, etc). The cultural model exemplified by this idiomatic 
expression entails a metaphoric mapping of the conceptual schema 'loss of 
function by loss of mechanical part' onto the conceptual schema ' 
handicapped mental process/ability'. In the mapping, the ontological, 
epistemological and logical structural assumptions of one domain are 
transposed to the other domain.  
Throughout this discussion of the synthetic-onomasiological 
representation and derivation process, it can be inferred that there exists a 
mutually constraining relationship between the conceptualization level of 
the model and the formulation level. If the selected pragmatic function 
underlying the cultural model involves 'negative ascription', and, at the 
same time, the cultural model encodes the mental schema the mind is a 
machine (or machine-like), these choices are likely to constrain the type of 
predication format (type of state of affairs and types of entities involved) 
and expression encoding at the formulation level.  
A further synthetic specification would spell out all the 
alternatives available in the repertoire of predications and expressions for 
a given pragmatic function and mental schematic function. Besides a 
repertoire of free grammatical expressions, there is a number of set 
phrases and expressions, idiomatic and proverbial expressions, or quasi-
syntactic formulas available to the speaker in the cultural-linguistic 
repertoire, (eg. for the above cultural-cognitive model, cfr. Sp. "No le 
funcionan las neuronas", "Tiene el disco duro estropeado", "Es de piñón 
fijo, etc.). Whatever the choice, the selection of linguistic means can be 
seen as a secondary, subservient step in the derivation, following the 
selection of the cultural model. On this view, the cultural models provide 
a higher-order cognitive-cultural repertoire constraining the lexical-
predicative selection of predications and expressions. The higher-order 
conceptualization mapping constrains the selection of lower-order 
predications (and their attendant selection processes of predicates and 
terms from the lexicon and the grammar). 
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However, a consideration is in order. Although the impression 
may have been given, that the model proposed to explain ascription of self 
properties to someone works mechanically and algorithmically, actually 
this is far from being the case. Speakers are involved in constant meaning-
construction creative processes, and they also make use in meaningful 
interaction of the culturally-constituted public semantic resources existing 
in the language to convey certain pragmatic functions. Actually, most 
speakers probably engage in both types of meaning-construction 
processes. When speakers create their own private metaphorizations and 
conceptualizations, discourse models of language and thought may take 
over from predicative ones. In such narratological textual meaning-
creation processes, speakers must be aware of the relevance, retrievability 
and shareability conditions of their own private metaphoric mappings 
(Shen, 1992; Clark, 1992). Other types of special-purpose discourse 
evolve their own discursive metaphoric projections, which may be highly 
idiosyncratic, or highly expert-oriented.  
The synthetic-onomasiological approach allows us to compare 
different models of categorization of properties of the self. Consider, for 
instance the 'in/out' and 'up/down 'containment and orientation schemas 
discussed in the cognitive linguistic literature (cfr. Johnson, 1987). 
According to Johnson, there are five entailments following from the in-out 
orientation schemata (1987:22):  
 
- The experience of containment involves protection from, or 
resistance to, external forces.  
- Containment also limits and restricts forces within the container. 
- The contained object becomes fixed in location because of the 
restraint of forces 
- The contained object becomes either accessible or inaccessible 
to the view of some observer.  
- Transitivity of containment.  
 
Such entailments can be encoded in Spanish by means of 
expressions such as 'Está encerrado en sí mismo'; 'Se siente atrapado'; 'Es 
una persona muy abierta'; 'Es muy cerrado de mollera'. At the same time, 
the existence in English and Spanish of inessive expressions involving 
predicative attributes such as 'salido', 'descentrado', 'spaced out', etc., 
reveals that in both languages the conceptualization of abnormal or less-
than-normal states of mind (generally involving mental and emotive states 
and processes) relies equally on the mapping of embodied spatial and 
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orientation metaphoric projections. An embodied schema is a schematic 
structure that is constantly operating in our perception, bodily movement 
through space, and physical manipulation of objects (Johnson, 1987:23). 
In the in-out orientation schema, the within category is in the (by default) 
appropriate container. Thus, the logical structure of this categorization 
includes the entailment that the without or outside category is the negation 
of the within one. In the folk model of self, this means that going beyond 
the boundaries of the bounds of the category entails going out of the 
normality parameter and into the abnormality one. The abnormality 
parameter also has an outskirts and a core. The distance between the 
within category and the without category may be longer or shorter; and 
the orientational trajectory higher or lower.  
From our standpoint, these schemas serve as conceptual vehicles 
for the conveyance of conceptual meanings involving a hierarchy of 
normality as well as a polarization between good and bad states of mind. 
The in/out schema represents the terms of a dichotomous spatial 
polarization between a positive conception of self, defined as a space or 
territory inside of which there is normality (unmarked) and a negative 
conception of self, defined as the state resulting from leaving the 
normality space or territory (marked). Thus, we have: 
 
I. (Positive Pole): Inside: States of Normality 
II. (Negative Pole): Outside: State of Abnormality: Deviancy, 
Impairment, Impersonality, Non-personality, Extraordinariness. Such 
terms as those belonging to the outside pole typically seem to convey 
states referring to, or describing personality traits involving sensory 
deprivation, special bodily and mental states, ill-health, sexual conduct, 
madness, mental or physical excess, overexertion, excitement, and the 
like. In Spanish expressions conveying this metaphor typically contain 
forms of verbs of motion like: ir, salir, perder, escapar, volar (eg. 'Perdió 
la cabeza'; 'Se te escapa la cabeza'; 'Está ido/volado/salido'). 
We offer an interpretation of the cognitive-cultural model 
underlying the in-out schematic projections for Normal/Abnormal states 
of mind: 
 
Cognitive-cultural assumptions: 
A) Main assumption: An abnormal state of mind is the result of a 
movement from a normal state 
B) Epistemic assumptions: 
The original state is naturalness, normality. 
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This state is the starting space or enclosure. 
This space entails a primary natural limit. 
The end state is unnaturalness, abnormality. 
This state is the end space or enclosure or lack of space or enclosure. 
This space entails a non-primary limit. 
C) Axiological assumptions: 
The outside states are not good or desirable (subject to evaluation, 
criticism, acceptance). 
The outside states are more or less dangerous or unacceptable and hence 
have undesirable consequences (subject to control, restraint, punishment, 
rejection, etc.). 
 
For its part, the much-studied 'up/down' schema represents the 
terms of a vertical conceptualization of polarized metaphoric concepts: 
 
1. Positive: UP IS HAPPY/GOOD (good feelings, good states of mind) 
2. Negative: DOWN IS SAD/BAD (bad feelings, bad states of mind) as 
manifested in examples like Sp. 'Está por los suelos', 'Cayó en la 
depresión', 'Se ha rebajado', 'Está hundido', Éstá en la gloria', etc.  
But there may exist other alternative spatial projections. One such type is 
the 'attachment/detachment' schema, combined with orientation and 
containment schemas. One variant of this schema includes the conceptual 
dimension 'solid bottom ground', in which the positive term of the 
polarized dichotomy encapsulates concepts of solidity concerning moral 
stances and ethical behavior, at least in Spanish, as evinced by examples 
like 'Tiene buen fondo', 'Es incommovible', 'Es de moral sólida'. Another 
variant includes the schema 'detachment from right centredness', which is 
found in expressions such as Sp. 'Estar desquiciado' (akin to Eng. 'To be 
unhinged'), or its causative counterpart, 'Sacar de quicio (= Eng. drive 
crazy). 
 
As a rule, it seems to us that in Spanish the tendency is for the 
in/out schema to realize the normality/abnormality scale, and the up/down 
one to realize the good states of mind/bad states of mind polarized 
dichotomy. If so, we might construe the difference between the following 
two expressions: 
 
(a) Está en una nube 
(b) Está en las nubes 
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in the following way. Whereas (b) usually refers to someone who 
simply is unaware of something happening (i.e. someone who is in an 
(abnormal) state of mental muddle or confusion), (a) means "to be in a 
state of bliss, joy". Thus, (a) seems to belongs to the up/down schema, but 
(b) to the in/out schema.  
 
2.2.2 A Note on the Analytic-Semasiological Approach 
 
Due to lack of space we are unable to offer a detailed 
exemplification of the analytic-semasiological approach; one or two 
instances will perhaps suffice to illustrate its import. One of the functions 
of this approach is the study of the decoding process: working out the 
models and functions underlying expressions. Another function is the 
sudy of the differential co-relation between Conceptualization and 
Formulation, in particulcar, the deambiguation of polysemic expressions. 
With the analytic semasiological approach we can analyze the cultural 
models and cognitive schemas shared by a given predication/expression as 
a polysemous encoding device. Take for instance the ambiguous Spanish 
inessive expression, 'Es muy corto'. Used as an ascription of personality 
trait (rather than, say, a 'description of a person's height), this expression is 
in fact ambiguous between several readings. The semasiological analysis 
allows us to derive the different models implied by the dimensional spatial 
predicate 'corto':  
 
1. CORTO-1: 'corto de mente' [ = not very clever, sharp]. 
Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Mental Ability; 
2. CORTO-2: 'corto de miras' [ = having modest aspirations, 
goals). Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Depth of Vision.  
3. CORTO-3: 'corto de trato' [ = shy, not good at socializing]. 
Metaphoric Association: Spatial Dimension and Social Distance. 
Hence the same spatial mental schema and predicative ascription can be 
used for different cognitive-cultural functions. Again, one could further 
taxonomize contrastively the spatial-dimensional conception of self 
implied by these expressions with regard to other spatial conceptions 
making use of alternative models, such as the spatial-containment schema: 
cfr. Sp. 'Está que no cabe en su cuerpo de gozo', 'Está llena de alegría', 'Se 
siente vacío', etc. Here the ascriptions make reference to positive and 
negative emotive states of mind, pointing to a view of the self as 
container, and of emotions as fluids or substances filling in, overflowing 
or emptying out of the container.  
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3. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we have presented a programmatic study of the 
categorization of self in Spanish, and less focally in English, emphasizing 
its representation and derivation from a cognitive-cultural point of view. 
More particularly, we have offered a classification of some of the 
dimensions, parameters, attributes and features involved in the 
representation of the category, and then proposed a model for the 
derivation of expressions, distinguishing between an encoding-oriented 
synthetic approach from a decoding-oriented analytic one. We have 
started from the cognitive anthropological assumption that, as calimed by 
Shweder and Bourne, "the metaphors by which people live and the world 
views to which they subscribe mediate the relationship between what one 
thinks and how one thinks [...] The way a culture's world view and master 
metaphors per se influence the relationship between what one thinks about 
an how one thinks" (1984:159). This signifies that, from a cognitive-
cultural perspective, cultures live by metaphors and world-premises that 
direct their attention and affect to particular systems, relationally 
conceived and contextually appraised. The concept of self, therefore, 
provides an interesting comparative domain from which to draw a 
possible ratio of universalist vs. relativist tendencies in cultural meaning 
systems, in particular, the investigation of what the way we talk about 
ourselves or others, tells us about how and what we think of them, and 
hence, about what our way of thinking-talking is like, and, further, what it 
all reveals about our cognitive and axiological orientations and styles, our 
style of communicating, conceptualizing, reasoning strategies, etc. 
Admittedly, the latter goals are totally beyond the scope of this article. We 
have only attempted to offer some general ways in which we can approach 
the study of how the concept of self (revealed in our ways of describing, 
ascribing and referring to persons, their cognitive, emotive and behavioral 
traits, characteristics, etc.) is represented in Spanish and, less focally, in 
English, as a first approximation towards a more elaborated cultural-
cognitive account of the concept of self from which one may derive 
further applications and implications (for instance, a cross-cultural 
cognitive ethnography of English-speaking and Spanish-speaking 
cultures).  
On this vein, we may advance the tentative hypothesis that the 
conceptual mappings involving source and target domains to represent 
attributes of self are sensitive to a metaphorization hierarchy made up of 
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values implicit in the individualistic-collectivistic cultural-psychological 
dimension. That is to say, collectivistic (traditional) cultures, which 
emphasize public-self and in-group values over private-self and out-group 
values will tend to show a higher incidence of cognitive-cultural-linguistic 
mappings involving the dimensions of nature, animals, etc in the 
conceptualization of behavioral, mental, and emotive traits, or in the 
description of functional parts of self, and the location of functional 
centers, etc. (Cfr. naturalization, animation, reification expressions like 
Sp. 'Es un volcán' (emotion: deep); 'Trabaja como un mulo' (ability: 
endurance of hardships); 'Se comporta como un cerdo' (manners: 
shockingly rude); 'Es un corderito' (character: mild); 'Es un lince' (mental 
functioning: clever); 'Quien a buen ármol se arrima buena sombra le 
cobija (exemplary emulation). On the other hand, individualistic (modern, 
technocratic) cultures tend to favor machines, artifacts (cfr. Sp. 'Está 
hecho una chatarra', 'Es un robot', 'Es una máquina', 'Está muy 
revolucionado', 'Le falta un chip', etc.), and at the same time are more 
liable to be receptive to expert models: cfr., for instance, nowadays-
common-psychoanalytic terms like 'repressed', 'neurotic', or even textual 
ones like 'el yo y sus circumstancias' coined by the philosopher Ortega y 
Gasset. Typical also of experts' models is the existence of tropological 
creations, an example of which is the so-called 'self-help therapeutic' 
discourse, where one finds expressions like: "You must get rid of your 
inner custodian to get in touch with your real self" (from Gail Sheeye's 
best-selling book, Passages: Predictable crises in adult life. 1974). In this 
text we are dealing with an expert (a therapist's) cultural model of self 
with a number of special assumptions following from it about self-
realization and self-healing philosophy, and a number of orientational, 
spatial and ontological metaphors serving as the linguistic-conceptual 
vehicles of expression, such as the self as sacred inner space rescued from 
usurped inner space.  
If the above hypothesis bears up, one might expect more  
ambivalence and change in the cognitive-cultural metaphoric projections 
of the categorization of self in Spanish-speaking cultures, as they may be 
said to be in the process of undergoing a change from a collectivist to an 
individualistic culture.  
Finally, it goes without saying that a more in-depth and 
comprehensive study of the categorization of self from a universalist and a 
cross-semantic standpoint would necessarily require the inclusion of a 
historical-diachronic dimension or what Rorty (1989) refers to as 
"changes of vocabulary" in the "metanarrative structure" of cultures. 
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